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“Talk of Marriage” in Northwest England:

Continuity and Change in Matrimonial Litigation, 1560-1640
Jennifer McNabb
Western Illinois University
This article suggests that the matrimonial culture of northwest England from 1560

to 1640 was marked by a complex range of strategies, values, and processes that
emphasized matrimony as a performative process. While present-tense language
of consent created, in the words of sixteenth-century lawyer Henry Swinburne,
the “Substance and indissoluble knot of Matrimony,” people in the northwest
consistently identified other words, actions, and attitudes that also communicated
matrimonial intent. Litigation from the diocese of Chester’s two consistory courts
features considerable “talk of marriage” by litigants and deponents and reveals
an enduring emphasis in the northwest on public performance of matrimonial
consent through cultural, social, and economic negotiations and exchanges. This
evidence also suggests ways in which rival notions about matrimonial propriety
began to alter the cultural framework through which people in the northwest interpreted marriage prior to the civil wars.1

In A Treatise of Spousals, sixteenth-century lawyer Henry Swin-

burne sought to produce a convenient digest of law pertaining to
1 Research at the West Yorkshire Archives Service at Leeds (hereafter, WYAS Leeds)
and the Borthwick Institute in York in 2007 was funded by a grant from Western Illinois
University’s University Research Council, College of Arts and Sciences, and Department
of History. I would like to express thanks to Jim Forse and Abby Lagemann, my fellow
panelists in the “Continuity and Change in the Tudor North” session at the joint meeting of
the Wooden O Symposium and Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association
meeting in August 2010, to the audience of the panel, and to the Executive Board of the
RMMRA for their selection of this paper for the Delno C. West Award.
The phrase “talk of marriage” is one employed repeatedly by early modern litigants and witnesses in consistory court suits involving disputed matrimony from northwest
England. It is employed in the records both as a descriptor of the negotiations of prospective spouses, kin, and friends that predated marital vows and as a more generic, catch-all
phrase to describe discussions of matrimonial values and practices. See below for a discussion of the methodologies used to evaluate “talk of marriage” in this article.
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the making of marriage.2 He opened his text by defining spousals
as “a mutual Promise of future marriage” and then complicated that
characterization through an extensive discussion of the complex relationship between spousals and matrimony in early modern English
theory and practice.3 The fact that indissoluble marriage could be
effected in a variety of ways in early modern England made Swinburne’s task of synthesizing erudite opinion with popular attitudes
an especially challenging one.4 Although the Church of England
sought to institutionalize its control over the making of marriage,
the failure to reform English marriage law until 1753 meant that early modern matrimony continued to be governed by medieval canon
law, a circumstance that offered prospective spouses extra-eccle2 Henry Swinburne, A Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts (London: S. Roycroft, 1686; repr., New York: Garland Publishing, 1985). Citations are to the Garland
facsimile edition, vol. 3 of the Marriage, Sex, and the Family in England 1660-1800 series,
ed. Randolph Trumbach. See also J. Duncan M. Derrett, Henry Swinburne (?1551-1624)
Civil Lawyer of York, St. Anthony’s Hall Publications, no. 44 (York, UK: St. Anthony’s
Press, 1973). Swinburne’s was not, of course, the only early modern text to address the
laws and customs of marriage in England. Additional contemporary discussions include,
among others, T. E., The Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights (London: John More, 1632;
repr., The English Experience, no. 922, Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1979), and
William Perkins, Christian Oeconomie: or, A Short Svrvey of the Right Manner of Erecting
and Ordering a Families, According to the Scriptures, trans. Thomas Pickeringe (London:
F. Kyngston, 1609).
3 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, 1.
4 Studies of early modern marriage that shaped this discussion include Lawrence Stone,
The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New York: Harper and Row, 1977);
Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990); Alan Macfarlane,
The Origins of English Individualism: the Family, Property and Social Transition (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1978); Macfarlane, Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction,
1300-1840 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986); R. H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990); Peter Rushton, “Property, Power and
Family Networks: The Problem of Disputed Marriage in Early Modern England” Journal
of Family History 11, (1986): 205-219; Rushton “The Testament of Gifts: Marriage Tokens
and Disputed Contracts in North-East England, 1560-1630,” Folk Life 24 (1985-86): 2531; Jeremy Boulton, “Itching After Private Marryings? Marriage Customs in Seventeenthcentury London,” The London Journal 16, no. 1 (1991): 15-34. Diana O’Hara, Courtship
and Constraint: Rethinking the Making of Marriage in Tudor England (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000); and Catherine Frances, “Making Marriages in Early Modern England:
Rethinking the Role of Family and Friends,” in The Marital Economy in Scandinavia and
Britain 1400-1900, ed. Maria Ågren and Amy Louise Erickson (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2005), 39-55.
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siastical means of creating legitimate marital unions.5 Swinburne
noted, for example, that the reciprocation of matrimonial consent
in present-tense language (per verba de praesenti) constituted “the
end or execution of Marriage,” regardless of its publicity, location,
witnesses, or clerical supervision.6 His text also acknowledged that
spousals could feature objects and actions whose exchange or performance possessed the ability to transform matrimonial intent into
“the very Substance” of marriage.7
Swinburne’s text provides a detailed explication of the
means by which “irregular marriages” lacking the direct oversight
of the Church could be performed so as to be recognizable by witnesses as constituting a valid union. 8 It thus serves as a testament to
the fact that multiple meanings of and paths into marriage coexisted
in early modern England. Another valuable source used by scholars to evaluate the form and function of early modern matrimony is
litigation concerning disputed marriage filed in England’s network
of church courts, administered by bishops and their agents. These

5 The Church encouraged couples to announce intent to marry through three readings of
the banns, followed by a public ceremony in a church with witnesses, a certified officiant, and an adherence to proscriptions concerning timing and impediments. For literature
advocating the “normalization” of matrimonial practices during the early modern period,
see Ralph Houlbrooke, Church Courts and the People during the English Reformation,
1520-1570 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979); Houlbrooke, “The Making of Marriage in MidTudor England: Evidence from Records of Matrimonial Contract Litigation,” Journal of
Family History 10 (1985): 339-52; Martin Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in
England, 1570-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987); Ingram, “Spousals Litigation in
the English Ecclesiastical Courts c. 1350-c. 1640,” in Marriage and Society: Studies in
the Social History of Marriage, ed. R. B. Outhwaite (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981),
35-57; Ingram, “The Reform of Popular Culture? Sex and Marriage in Early Modern England,” in Popular Culture in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. Barry Reay (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1985), 129-65; John R. Gillis, For Better, For Worse: British Marriages,
1600 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985), Part I; David Cressy, Birth, Marriage,
and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1997); R. B. Outhwaite, The Rise and Fall of the English Ecclesiastical Courts,
1500-1860 (Cambridge: CUP, 2006). For a discussion of the circumstances leading to Lord
Hardwicke’s Act of 1753, see Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage in England, 1500-1850
(London: Hambledon Press, 1995).
6 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, 74.
7 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, 6.
8 By “irregular marriage” I refer to those unions formed by means and circumstances
other than those recommended by the church, enumerated in note 4 above.
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consistory courts had jurisdiction over a range of spiritual matters,
including marriage, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
and possessed power both to initiate process ex officio (from the office of the bishop) and to entertain litigation instigated by laypersons
against one another (instance suits). This essay uses office and instance suits to explore continuity and change concerning the words,
actions, and attitudes whose performance signified the making of
marriage in early modern England.9 I argue that litigation from the
consistory courts at Chester and Richmond reveals an enduring emphasis in northwest England on the public enactment of matrimonial
consent through cultural, social, and economic negotiations and exchanges, even as rival notions about matrimonial propriety began
to alter the “cultural frame” through which people interpreted the
performance of marriage prior to the civil wars.10
To investigate “talk of marriage” in the early modern northwest, I use libels, responsions, interrogatories, and depositions from
approximately 180 matrimonial suits heard by the Consistory Court
of Chester, the Consistory Court of Richmond, and the archiepiscopal court at York, which served as the court of appeals for both
consistories, from 1560 to 1640.11 Marriages and their formation in

9 I thus subscribe to the assertion of cultural historians and new historicists that performative symbols work “not merely because of their metaphorical power but also by virtue of
their position within a cultural frame.” Robert Darnton, “History and Anthropology,” in
idem, The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in Cultural History (New York: Norton, 1990),
342. For an overview of recent trends in cultural history, see Karen Harvey, ed., The Kiss in
History (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2005), especially the editor’s “Introduction,” 1-15.
10 For scholarship on the diocese of Chester and its jurisdiction (which included Cheshire,
Lancashire, and portions of Cumbria, Westmorland, western Yorkshire, and Wales), see
John Addy, Sin and Society in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge, 1989); Christopher Haigh, Reformation and Resistance in Tudor Lancashire (London: Cambridge UP,
1975); C. B. Philips and J. H. Smith, Lancashire and Cheshire from AD 1540 (London:
Longman, 1994); A History of the County of Chester, ed. B. E. Harris, vol. 3, Victoria History of the Counties of England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980); W. A. Shaw, “Ecclesiastical
History from the Reformation,” in A History of the County of Lancaster, ed. William Farrer
and J. Brownbill, vol. 2, 40-101, Victoria History of the Counties of England, ed. William
Page (London: Archibald Constable, 1908); Garthine Melissa Walker, “Crime, Gender
and the Social Order in Early Modern Cheshire” (PhD diss., Liverpool University, 1994);
Tim Thornton, Cheshire and the Tudor State 1480-1560 (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press,
2000); Thornton, “Local Equity Jurisdictions in the Territories of the English Crown: The
Palatinate of Chester, 1450-1540,” in Courts, Counties, and the Capital in the Later Middle
Ages, ed. Diana E. S. Dunn (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 27-52; Joan Beck, Tudor
Cheshire, vol. 7, A History of Cheshire, ed. J. J. Bagley (Chester: Chester Community
Council, 1969); and Steve Hindle, “Aspects of the Relationship of the State and Local Society in Early Modern England: With Special Reference to Cheshire, c. 1590-1630” (PhD
diss., University of Cambridge, 1992).
11 For the Chester consistory, see Cheshire Record Office, Deposition Books of the Consistory Court of Chester, 1554-1574 (hereafter, CRO EDC 2/6, 2/7, 2/8, or 2/9), consisting
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the northwest were the subject of additional suits in the collections
under consideration, but their records contain only formulaic, procedural documents and thus were not included in this sample. The
suits examined here involved disputes concerning child marriages
as well as those featuring spousals entered into by individuals who
by virtue of age were deemed capable of expressing matrimonial assent.12 It can be argued that such materials are flawed because they
represent fractured rather than “normal” matrimonial activities and
because litigants and witnesses employed fictional elements in their
narratives to bolster their legal claims.13 However, even if matrimonial litigation represents failed courtship and even if testimony
of witness testimony and identified below by their folio or page references (following the
style used in the individual deposition books), and Cause Papers of the Consistory Court
of Chester, 1560-1653 (hereafter, CRO EDC 5), consisting of procedural papers (libels,
responsions, interrogatories, depositions, articles, and sentences) and referenced below by
year and file number. The cause paper materials for Richmond are found in the following record classes at WYAS Leeds: RD/AC/1 (Allegations, Articles or Libels), RD/AC/2
(Responsions), RD/AC/3 (Interrogatories), RD/AC/5 (Attestations and Depositions), RD/
AC/6 (Further Articles or Exceptions), and RD/AC/7 (Sentences). See also WYAS Leeds
RD/A class for the Act Books of the Consistory Court of Richmond. The appeals material
for both courts is housed at the Borthwick Institute: Ecclesiastical Cause Papers at York:
Files Transmitted on Appeal, 1500-1883 (hereafter, Borthwick Institute Trans CP). Only
appeals files at York have been examined; matrimonial suits heard by the Consistory Court
of York in its own diocesan jurisdiction have not been considered here. These archival
sources are supplemented by Frederick J. Furnivall, ed., Child-Marriages, Divorces, and
Ratifications, &c., in the Diocese of Chester, A. D. 1561-6 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trübner, 1897), which includes transcriptions of both child marriage suits and matrimonial
contract litigation, and the small handful of suits dated after 1640 in the CRO EDC 5 collection. One hundred thirty-two of the 179 total suits deal with irregular marriage between
parties over the ages of consent, and 47 are child marriage suits. For “talk of marriage,”
see note 1 above.
12 Swinburne’s treatise distinguishes between two distinct types of spousals related to
the life-cycle, those contracted by children under the “ripe or lawful Age of Marriage”
and those contracted by individuals who had reached the canonical ages of consent. See
Treatise of Spousals, Chapters 6-8. For a discussion of the features and occasions of child
marriage in the northwest, see the discussion below.
13 For a sampling of scholarship addressing methodological approaches for using court
records from late medieval and early modern England, see Rushton, “Property, Power and
Family Networks,” 205-17; Laura Gowing, “Language, Power and the Law: Women’s
Slander Litigation in Early Modern London,” in Women, Crime and the Courts in Early
Modern England, edited by Jennifer Kermode and Garthine Walker (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 26-47; O’Hara, Courtship and Constraint, 10-16; and
Shannon McSheffrey, Marriage, Sex and Civic Culture in Late Medieval London (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 11-14. Charles Donahue also reminds
readers that court cases tell subjective stories rather than objective truths about marriage,
and he identifies and labels particular story patterns in his examination of late medieval
marriage in English and continental courts: Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle
Ages: Arguments about Marriage in Five Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 1011, 46-62.
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contains fictive elements, the fact remains that respondents and deponents told stories they believed to be persuasive and to have resonance with both popular practice and law; the rhetorical strategies
they employed thus needed to be both plausible and recognizable to
be effective. To provide a counterbalance to the purposefully constructed narratives in legal actions focusing on disputed matrimony,
I have also surveyed more than 2,200 additional, non-matrimonial
instance suits filed in Chester’s consistory for incidental “talk of
marriage.”14 This litigation, stemming from defamation, pew and
testamentary disputes, and controversies over tithe payments, represents an important and underutilized source for courtship and matrimony. It reveals that deponents in a range of legal actions, although
ostensibly commenting on matters sometimes only tangentially
related to matrimony, found ample occasion to communicate their
ideas about the words, actions, and attitudes that signified marriage
in the northwest.
Among the matrimonial suits filed in the consistories at
Chester and Richmond with some regularity during the period under
consideration were those concerning marriages initiated on behalf
of children younger than the official age of consent. As Swinburne
notes, the canonical impediment concerning age meant that child
marriages contracted for those under the age of seven were invalid
due to the parties’ inability to give mental or physical consent. Contracts made for children between the ages of seven and twelve (for
girls) or fourteen (for boys) were binding in the same way that contracts made by future-tense language (per verba de futuro) were;
they became unbreakable as a consequence of sexual intercourse and
an exchange of consent after the attainment of the age of maturity.15
The suits sampled for this article indicate that although the majority
of the child marriage cases in the northwest were concentrated in the
14 To create a broad sample of the plentiful cause papers of the Consistory Court of
Chester, I examined all the court’s business in the first and sixth years of each decade under
investigation as well as the years 1571-79, 1591-94, 1611-19, and 1631-34 in the CRO
EDC 5 collection. The total number of suits from the collection considered in the sample
years is 2,251.
15 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, Chapters 6-8.
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1560s and 1570s, they continued with some frequency through the
1630s.16 Evidence for the continuance of child marriage is not only
contained in contract litigation between child spouses, however;
glimpses of more “successful” child marriages appear in other types
of suits. For example, a cause from 1593 alleging the adultery of
Marie Cragg includes the assertion of her husband, Richard Cragg,
that he “was but tend[e]r of yeares by the p[er]swasion & p[ar]tlie
by the threatning[es] of his fath[e]r [when] he did intermarie w[i]th
the said Marie.”17 According to witness testimony, the marriage was
subsequently ratified by both parties, and the couple had two children. Had Marie’s later adultery not come to light, evidence of what
was likely a child marriage that had, for a time at least, been found
acceptable by both parties would not exist in the records. Clearly
the strategies of Richard Cragg’s father had worked as he (and other
fathers, mothers, kin, and guardians in the northwest, no doubt) intended: the marriage was validated without recourse to legal action
when the children reached the ages of consent.
These suits concerning child marriage indicate that the issue of age could spark controversy on the occasion of a ruptured
relationship, as age played a seminal role in determining the validity
of expressed consent. When Robert Wainwright rejected his child
marriage to Christiana Williamson and married Elizabeth Golborne
instead, questions concerning age prompted diverse responses from
deponents in the subsequent litigation filed on Christiana’s behalf in
16 For an overview of the canonical position of the church concerning the invalidity of
child marriages, see Ralph Houlbrooke, The English Family 1450-1700 (London: Longman, 1984), 68. For an assessment regarding regionalism and child marriages, see Ingram,
Church Courts, Sex, and Marriage, 128-29. In her study of marriage and the Consistory
Court of Chester from 1570 to 1670, Catherine Frances argues that the majority of suits
involving the breakdown of relationships did not feature age or force, and she does not consider child marriage as a category in her analysis of matrimonial litigation (see “Making
Marriages in Early Modern England,” 42). I contend that child marriage and disputes concerning age are important to an understanding of the matrimonial culture of the northwest.
See Jennifer McNabb, “Ceremony Versus Consent: Courtship, Illegitimacy, and Reputation in Northwest England, 1560-1610,” Sixteenth Century Journal 37, no. 1 (2006): 5981, and McNabb, “Fame and the Making of Marriage in Northwest England, 1560-1640,”
Quidditas, the Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association 26
& 27 (2005-2006): 9-33 for additional considerations of this issue.
17 See CRO EDC 5 1593, no. 9.
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1637.18 While the deponents were universally agreed that Christiana
was younger than the canonical age of consent at the time of the
marriage in May 1634, Robert’s age was considerably more contested. According to some, he was at least fourteen years old and “of
good judgem[en]t and disc[re]c[i]on”; others insisted that he was
“about thirteene years of age & no more.” The discrepancy was of
vital importance: if he had been fourteen at the time of the marriage
ceremony, his words and actions on that occasion as well as during
the time that followed had the power to bind him to Christiana. The
debate intensified over charges that the parish register in Christleton had been tampered with; testimony revealed that two entries for
Robert Wainwright existed in the record of baptisms, the first from
October 1619 and another from January 1624.19 Witnesses weighed
in on the veracity of the entries, plumbing their memories to offer testimony concerning other public and personal events contemporary to Robert’s birth. Thomas Johnes, for example, advocated
for the earlier baptismal date of 1619 by recalling that two women
in town “were with child when the said Elizabeth Wainwright, deceased, was with child of the said Robert Wainwright” and concluding that the women “had two daughters borne and christened the
said yeare [1619] that the said Robert Wainwright was christened.”
Deponents and litigants from the northwest voiced the opinion that couples could display consent or dissent by both verbal and
non-verbal means.20 Witnesses in child marriage suits focused in
their responsions and attestations not on precise words spoken by or
18 CRO EDC 5 1637, nos. 13 and 14. For additional debates over age at marriage, see, for
example, CRO EDC 5 1575, no. 23; 1613, no. 46; and 1616, no. 74.
19 The existence of these two entries further required deponents to affirm there was just
one man named Wainwright in Christleton who had been married during the years under
consideration, thereby negating the possibility of two married men registering the baptism
of a legitimate son named Robert. The witnesses also attempted to weigh in on a debate
over the age of Robert’s younger brother, Thomas. Some implied that the second entry for
Robert was a clerical error, intended to record Thomas’s baptism instead.
20 According to the law, actions alone could not make spouses the same way words could,
but the evidence from litigation suggests that witnesses believed actions could have powerful performative value. See R. H. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1974), 27, for a discussion of performative words in medieval
England.
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on behalf of litigants who had been younger than the canonical ages
of consent at the time of marriage; they emphasized instead expressions of a later refusal of assent as demonstrated by various verbal,
visual, and economic markers.21 Those seeking to nullify child marriages and their supporters, for example, stress in their statements
to the courts the absence of gifts, affection, sexual intercourse, and
cohabitation independent of adult guardians subsequent to a church
marriage ceremony and particularly after the spouses reached the
canonical ages of maturity.
Testimony suggests that friends, neighbors, and kin both
watched carefully for the performance of behaviors that could act
to ratify a child marriage and took the opportunity to play their own
roles in such performances as a means of acknowledging their acceptance of a match as valid. The Williamson c Wainwright and
Golborne suit featured witness testimony from a range of observers: servants in the Williamson household, neighbors and acquaintances of all three parties and their parents, and several relatives of
the litigants.22 In addition to commenting on the ages of Christiana
and Robert at the time of their marriage, witnesses also discussed
the couple’s subsequent cohabitation in the Williamson household
and their signs of assent or dissent from the union as they grew to
maturity. All were agreed that Robert resided in the Williamson
household upon the conclusion of his marriage with Christiana, but
consensus broke down over the particular circumstances of his treatment in the house of his child bride. Margaret Wright, who lived as
servant in the household for fifteen months, affirmed that she had
often seen the couple alone “both in the chamber where hee himself
[Robert] laye and likewise in the chamber where she [Christiana]
laye.” Supporters of Christiana’s cause, like Eleanor Newall, noted
that Robert’s new father-in-law kept him “in good & handsome close
21 The typical formula in depositions from witnesses of child marriage ceremonies usually involved a simple identification of the parish church in which the ceremony took place
followed by an assessment of the ages of the parties involved.
22 The discussion of this suit is drawn from CRO EDC 5 1637, nos. 13 and 14.
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& apparell” and thoughtfully supervised his education; she testified
that she had served as an audience to Richard Williamson’s repeated
admonishments to Robert to be more devoted to his studies. John
Maddock, by contrast, painted a picture of Robert’s ill treatment at
his father-in-law’s hands, claiming that Robert had been forced to
perform the role of servant in the Williamson household and that
he stayed there only because he had “noe other place of refuge,” a
justification Robert’s own response to the court echoes. Accounts
of mealtimes further included assertions that Robert had been made
to serve the family and guests on at least one occasion and that he
normally ate with the servants, although his mother-in-law always
served him meat before the others.
Swinburne’s text discusses the ways in which even small
gestures between child spouses who had reached the age of maturity could serve as “Deeds” by which “the former Spousals are
confirmed.”23 To “imbrace or kiss each other” signified consent
to matrimony, as did “calling or naming each other Husband and
Wife.”24 According to testimony, such “Deeds” appear to have had
considerable cultural significance in the northwest. Anne Brodhurst,
“one of the next neybores” of Helen and Thomas Gleave, testified in
1570 to hearing “Helen diverse tymes in familier talk…call [Thomas] husband and he hath called her wife.”25 In Jane Sworeton’s
response from a suit filed in 1616, she denied having “sate vpon
the knee” of Thomas Mosse of her “owne free will & accord” but
confessed that she sometimes “washed & starched” Thomas’s “linnens,” gestures other witnesses used to testify to her later assent to a
marriage concluded when she was younger than twelve.26 Observations of similar “Deeds” also joined the more substantive testimony
in Williamson c Wainwright and Golborne. Elizabeth Prince, for
example, testified that “shee hath seene & obserued them [Robert
23 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, 21.
24 Ibid.
25 CRO EDC 2/8, fols. 325r-327r.
26 CRO EDC 5 1616, no. 14.
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and Christiana] severall times kisse and imbrace one the other in a
loueinge & kinde maner as man & wife ought to doe.”27
Witnesses in contract suits involving spousals between those
of “ripe Age” also highlighted a variety of actions such as public
affection, cohabitation, and sexual intercourse that served to signify
the performance of spousal roles and to engender a popular perception of legitimacy among neighbors and kin, frequently identified
in the records by the phrase “common fame.”28 Forty percent of
the spousals suits, for example, include testimony alleging sexual
intercourse between purported spouses, and one-fifth comment on
their cohabitation.29 Just under one-sixth of the suits describe other
displays of physical affection such as kissing.30 According to testimony from 1640, for example, John Brenand and Maria Wilson
“kissed eich other” after Brenand’s promise of marriage, an act witnesses recognized as creating a binding contract.31 A number of the
suits refer to a pattern of multiple gestures between alleged spouses,
the collective weight of which allowed witnesses to note that the
couples were “comonly reputed & taken for lawfull man & wife” by
their family, friends, and neighbors.32 In 1593, for example, a deponent testified to hearing John Derwall refer to Ellen Taylor as “my
wiefe” and recounted that on the morning of Christmas Eve 1592,
John greeted Ellen with the phrase “Good morowe, wiefe,” to which
she responded, “Good morowe, husband.”33
27 CRO EDC 5 1637, no. 14.
28 For a treatment of spousals and “common fame” in the Consistory Court of Chester’s
jurisdiction, see McNabb, “Ceremony Versus Consent,” 55-81, and McNabb, “Fame and
the Making of Marriage,” 9-33.
29 Testimony concerning sexual intercourse was, of course, particularly important in
suits alleging futuro vows, as intercourse could transform promises for future marriage
into present consent. Such information was also a regular feature of suits alleging praesenti
vows and promises to marry.
30 See the essays in Harvey, The Kiss in History, passim, for an illuminating discussion
of the need for an understanding of the history of gestures such as kissing.
31 CRO EDC 5 1640, no. 23.
32 This language comes from CRO EDC 5 1616, no. 14, but variations of this theme appear with regularity in the sources.
33 CRO EDC 5, 1593, no. 52.
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Swinburne notes that to “give and receive Gifts and Tokens
either of them, to or from the other” helped to signal and establish
consent between couples, a practice the litigation from the northwest
affirms as a regular feature of matrimonial activities.34 Nearly forty
percent of the matrimonial contract suits considered here discuss the
exchange of objects between prospective spouses, and the items described range from wedding clothes and love letters to coins, aprons,
and gloves. These articles were commented on at length by those
who had been present at their exchange, carried gifts from one party
to another, or knew of their existence through the confidences of
giver or receiver. Witnesses frequently attached significance to gifts
in material terms, including an assessment of the monetary value
of tokens of affection in their testimony. The level of detail in deponents’ comments also indicates performative aspects of gift exchange; the giver initiated the performance by selecting and sending a token, the intended recipient then either accepted or refused
the offering (and occasionally reciprocated with a gift of his or her
own), and witnesses and go-betweens served as an audience and
frequently as temporary custodians of objects in transit.35
The records further indicate the emergence of certain patterns concerning the types of gifts employed in various stages of
courtship. The commentary of litigants and deponents suggests that
both men and women considered money an object suitable to express varying degrees of matrimonial interest. Mention of monetary
gifts appears in suits with and without testimony of the exchange
of matrimonial words between purported spouses; gifts of money
also accompanied alleged “promises” to marry as well as future- and
34 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, 21. For a discussion of gift giving in other courts’
jurisdictions, see Ruston, “Testament of Gifts,” for Durham, and O’Hara, Courtship and
Constraint, for Canterbury.
35 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans.
Ian Cunnison (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967); Jacques T. Godbout, The World of the Gift,
trans. Donald Winkler (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1998). O’Hara, in Courtship and
Constraint, 91-92, notes 5 and 6, provides a brief, useful literature review.
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present-tense vows.36 The practice of bending or breaking a coin between prospective spouses to signify assent to matrimony warrants
particular attention, as it appears with regularity in the suits featuring gift-giving, perhaps because it symbolically communicated the
sharing of affection and material resources initiated by marriage.
Witnesses and litigants described occasions of bending or breaking
a coin in rich detail, as when an unnamed witness carefully noted in
1617 that Alice Hulme kept “the one half” of the gold coin she broke
with Gerrard Hey while he kept “the oth[er].”37
Matrimonial intent was also represented by the exchange of
personal keepsakes and household stuff. Examples range from the
“hart of gold” given by Elizabeth Bird to Morgan Edmund in 1562
to the “c[er]ten juell[es] of sylver” Godfrey Walthew removed from
his own neck and placed around the neck of Katherine Knowles
after their exchange of vows as described in a suit from 1607.38 Witnesses noted in Williamson c Wainwright and Golborne that, in addition to the small sums of money Robert Wainwright gave Christiana Williamson, he once sent her “two penniworth of pairs [pears]”
and “cakes”; on another occasion, she gave him “a pare of roses for
his shooes.”39 To Elizabeth Golborne, the woman Robert subsequently married, he sent, “in token of his love and affection,” a pair
of gloves, a silver whistle, and a silver “seale.”
No gift had greater symbolic power to effect marriage,
though, than a ring, a fact Swinburne underscores in his treatise.40
36 The phrase “promise of marriage” appears with some frequency in the records, but
the degree of commitment it was intended to represent is unclear. It seems to be a term of
considerable elasticity, used by witnesses to comment on relationships ranging from those
that featured initial discussions of matrimony to those that indicated advanced negotiations
concerning financial settlements and impending marriage.
37 CRO EDC 5, 1617, no. 20.
38 Furnivall, Child-Marriages, 187; CRO EDC 5 1587, no. 42.
39 CRO EDC 5 1637, no. 14.
40 He notes, for example, that future tense vows could be made binding when “the Man
delivereth to the Woman a Ring, and doth put it on her fourth Finger.” Swinburne, Treatise
of Spousals, 71. For a discussion of rings as material economic objects of exchange in early
modern England, see Stephanie Chamberlain, “’Rings and Things’ in Twelfth Night: Gift
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Evidence from the northwest indicates popular subscription to the
notion that the giving and receiving of a ring could serve as a powerful performance of consent to matrimony. In a personal response
from 1621, for example, Thomas Orrell stressed that he did “never
give vnto the pl[ain]t[iff] [Margery Hollinshed] any gould ringe,”
as other witnesses had testified, clearly understanding the power
that particular object represented as confirmation of his ratification
of a marriage.41 Just under half of the suits whose records included testimony concerning gifts featured rings, and the occasions of
the giving almost without exception indicate an advanced stage of
courtship involving an alleged uttering of matrimonial language in
the present or future tense. For example, a suit from 1596 included
testimony that James Bankes and Ellen Lucas “dyd pledge & giue
ether to other there faith and trouth, and thereappon the said James
putt a ringe appon the said Ellen’s ffinger” to mark the occasion of
their matrimonial contract.42 Rings were also singled out in office
suits filed on grounds of clandestinity; witnesses seeking to demonstrate the propriety of private marriages noted the use of rings, as
prescribed in the marriage ceremony found in the Book of Common
Prayer.43 A suit filed in 1579 noted that when Janet Braithwaite and
Robert Cavnet spoke “certayne woord[es] of matrimonie” to each
other, Robert gave Janet “a ryng of sylver,” and another from 1625
recounted that the curate of Wrexham married John Pickering and
Elizabeth Page “according to the forme layde downe in the book of
Com[m]on Prayer w[i]th the vse of a ringe and other ceremonies
saveinge ban[n]es of m[at]r[im]onie were not published neyth[e]r
anie lycense p[ro]cured.”44
Exchange, Debt and the Early Modern Matrimonial Economy,” The Journal of the Wooden
O Symposium 7 (2007): 1-12.
41 CRO EDC 5 1621, no. 14.
42 CRO EDC 5 1596, no. 42.
43 “Clandestine” refers essentially to a private marriage, often in domestic settings, that
lacked the publicity of the banns or a marriage license.
44 WYAS RD/AC/2/34, and CRO EDC 5 1625, no. 47.
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Nearly one-quarter of the suits describe economic arrangements between couples that publicized their commitment and allowed friends and kin to judge matrimonial legitimacy, and these
suits demonstrate a considerable continuity across the decades examined. After Ralph Wood and Jane Cloughe exchanged consent
to marry in 1572, witnesses reported that Ralph had “vsed other her
necessarie good[es] about[es] the said Jane her house as familierlye
as thoughe they had ben his owne.”45 Six decades later, witnesses
reported that Richard Bradley approached “diu[er]s p[er]sons” indebted to Ellen Pemberton after the completion of their matrimonial
contract and threatened to sue those who failed to make good on the
“debt[es] w[hi]ch he said was due to his said wiefe Elen.”46
Against the backdrop of elements of continuity in the performance of matrimony in the northwest, the records suggest change in
the frequency with which disputes over the making of marriage came
before the courts. Matrimonial litigation was the subject of a long
but fairly steady decline in terms of its percentage of the Consistory
Court of Chester’s business: it constituted over 60 percent of cause
paper files that survive from 1565 but just 5 percent of those from
1635.47 An examination of the Consistory Court of Richmond’s act
books suggests that the proportion of matrimonial suits before that
court declined over time as well: a sample from the 1570s indicates
that at least 12 percent of the court’s annual instance litigation involved matrimonial issues, while a sample from the 1620s indicates
that 3 percent of the instance litigation per annum involved disputed
45 Borthwick Institute Trans CP 1573/3.
46 CRO EDC 5 1633, no. 60. The tangled relationship between Bradley and Pemberton is
also the subject of 1634, nos. 62 and 128.
47 McNabb, “Fame and the Making of Marriage,” 17. The actual numbers of matrimonial
suits remain relatively constant into the early seventeenth century; the dramatic increase in
the numbers of defamation suits, tithe disputes, testamentary business, and conflicts over
pews and other religious spaces, however, meant that these causes replaced matrimonial
suits as the dominant types of instance litigation. As indicated below, however, these other
types of suits yield valuable information on matrimonial culture in the northwest.
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matrimony.48 While R. B. Outhwaite cautions against equating a decline in contract litigation with the elimination of irregular marriage,
patterns of litigation in the northwest suggest certain alterations in
matrimonial values and practices, perhaps connected to the growing
integration of the northwest into the national polity and an acceptance of the need for a more formal entrance in marriage.49
The sources indicate that people in the northwest were beginning to subscribe to the notion that the process of performing matrimony was less effective and appropriate at communicating consent
than a single, public act sanctioned by the Church. This may have
been the result of a refusal by the consistory courts to uphold irregular marriage, but unfortunately, the uneven survival of the courts’
judgments in the cause papers makes this difficult to ascertain. Few
case files contain final sentences, and those that do often lack additional substantive documentation shedding light on the details of the
dispute; the dearth of contextualizing information thus renders such
final decisions unhelpful in gauging the courts’ stance on irregular
marriage. Incidental talk of marriage in non-matrimonial litigation
does, however, suggest a new desire for orderliness and formality
in the making of marriage in the northwest. Beginning in the early
1600s, deponents asked to attest to their suitability as witnesses were
questioned about the propriety of their own marriage ceremonies,
discussions absent from the records of suits from previous decades.
A defamation suit filed by Katherine Graddell against David, Margery, and Ellen Dobb in 1631, for example, required witnesses to
provide testimony as to the occasion and duration of their marriages
as well as the more usual information regarding their place of residence, their relationship to the litigants, and their financial worth.50
48 The act books from Richmond are unfortunately defective and thus prohibit any definitive measure concerning the frequency of matrimonial contract disputes in the court’s
business. The samples used here are found in WYAS Leeds RD/A/0/2, Act Book of the
Consistory Court of Richmond, 1570-1573, and RD/A/7B, Act Book of the Consistory
Court of Richmond, 1624-1628.
49 See Clandestine Marriage in England, 41, and note 9 above for literature on early
modern Cheshire.
50 CRO EDC 5 1631, no. 34.
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In response to the interrogatory about marriage in that suit, Hugh
Francis of Chester responded “that he was married about a yeare and
a halfe since, in St John’s Church, about nyne or ten of the clocke in
the daie time by M[aste]r Lloyd curate there, beinge three times first
asked in the s[ai]d church,” an account that doubtless met with the
approval of the court as a result of the ceremony’s strict adherence
to proper form.51 The implication contained in such questions and
responses is that reliable and respectable witnesses were those who
followed the Church’s prescribed methods of making marriage.52
Defamation suits from the second half of the period under
consideration also indicate an increasing intolerance of premarital
pregnancy in the northwest. Bearing a child, when coupled with
other words and gestures of matrimony, had, during the sixteenth
century, served as a powerful signifier of matrimonial assent; during the seventeenth century, by contrast, numerous defamation suits
were filed to combat charges the spouses had a child together before marriage.53 For example, in 1637 John Fletcher sued Elizabeth
Marsh for defamation for reporting that his wife had borne their
child four weeks before their marriage.54 Such evidence demonstrates that bearing a child prior to or shortly after a church wedding
had become subject to some measure of disapproval from members
51 The canons of 1604 reinforced the requirement to solemnize marriage between eight
o’clock and noon. J. V. Bullard, ed. Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical,1604: Latin
and English (London: Faith Press, 1934), 66, 108. The other witnesses commented on their
marriages but without quite the same degree of precision as Francis.
52 Such interrogatories were likely devised to cast doubt on the testimony provided by a
witness whose marriage was considered suspect, although the responses provided do not
always indicate which of the deponents was the true target of the question.
53 The records from the northwest courts indicate, for example, that the occasion of
pregnancy might initiate an ex officio suit for fornication that resulted in the couple’s declaration of their impropriety at the solemnization of their subsequent marriage. See, for
example, WYAS RD/A 3 B, Consistory Court of Richmond Act Book, 23 September - 14
December 1579, fol. 14v., involving an office case against John Walker and Jane Hutchenson of Grinton from 1579; they were required to admit their “fault” on the day their marriage was solemnized in the parish church of Grinton. An office suit against John Ayerigge
and Agnes Etherington from 1585 includes the assertion from John that the pair had made a
“contract between theim selves and were desyrous to have bene married” before their child
was born, a circumstance he claims had in fact transpired. See WYAS RD/A 4, Consistory
Court of Richmond Act Book, 26 April 1585 - 29 July 1588, fol. 28v.
54 CRO EDC 5 1637, no. 104.
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of a couple’s community, not a prompt for popular acceptance of the
performance of matrimonial consent.
This essay suggests that the matrimonial culture of northwest England from 1560 to 1640 was marked by a complex range
of strategies, values, and processes that emphasized matrimony as
a process driven by the performance of matrimonial assent. While
present-tense language of consent created the “Substance and indissoluble knot of Matrimony,” people in the northwest talked consistently in various types of litigation of other words, actions, and
attitudes that also communicated matrimonial intent.55 It is well
documented that these alternate signifiers of matrimony eventually
declined in importance in England, in part as a result of the Church’s
growing success in inculcating an understanding of its rules for publicity and orderliness in marriage.56 The civil wars also brought in
their wake an experiment with civil marriage and the suspension of
the consistories, which eliminated a key legal forum for disputed
matrimony.57 Additionally, the increasing efficiency of early modern bureaucracy and record-keeping concerning matrimony likely
reduced the necessity of symbolic and real exchanges, gestures, and
actions that had previously constituted the performative ritual of
making marriage.58 A study of litigation heardy by the ecclesiastical courts during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however,
serves as a reminder that matrimony, rather than being fixed and
universal in its form and function, has a performative history, the
investigation of which is necessary for a sophisticated and nuanced
understanding of early modern English society and culture.
55 Swinburne, Treatise of Spousals, 9.
56 Some of this stems from the early modern “reformation of manners,” a subject about
which the literature is substantial. For an overview as related to the history of gesture, see
Harvey, The Kiss in History, passim.
57 Chris Durston, “’Unhallowed Wedlocks’: The Regulation of Marriage during the English Revolution,” The Historical Journal 31, no. 1 (1988): 45-59; I. M. Green, The Reestablishment of the Church of England 1660-1663 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978), 131-42.
58 See Keith Thomas, “Afterword,” in The Kiss in History, 198.
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